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Economic policy analysis is extremely important 
for the relevancy of the agricultural economics pro-
fession, as applied economics is our professional 
niche. Economic policy analysis, however, as a 
public decision-support tool, is a challenging en-
deavor that is difficult to do well. Furthermore, if 
analysis is to be an input into public policy for-
mulation and implementation, it is not sufficient 
for applied economists to merely supply high qual-
ity economic policy analysis; there must also be a 
demand for it. As a profession, applied economists 
appear to pay more attention to the supply of 
policy analysis, with less consideration of who 
wants and will use our analysis, or how they will 
come to know it. 
  For this short paper, I will explore what I be-
lieve comprises high quality decision-oriented eco-
nomic public policy analysis. Then I will place 
that definition in the context of the demand for 
economic policy analysis. I will conclude with my 
opinions as to why finding an audience for non-
partisan policy analysis has become more diffi-
cult, and will identify ways for applied econo-




Policy-Relevant Economic Science 
 
Bromley (forthcoming) defines policy as com-
prised of intentions, rules, and enforcement that 
result in policy outcomes. While most applied 
economists relate easily to the meaning of “rules, 
enforcement, and outcomes,” we tend to be less 
conversant about policy intentions. 
  First, public policy is concerned not only with 
facts and competing interests, but also with val-
ues. Policy statements are about the right and 
wrong things to do (Bromley forthcoming, Wil-
davsky 1987). That is, public policy is about what 
preferences people should hold, what fair alloca-
tions of resources are, and what the legitimate 
scope of the government is (Wildavsky 1987). En-
vironmental policy debates include discussion of 
cultural and moral concerns pertaining to envi-
ronmental stewardship, justice, and equity (Graffy 
2005). 
  Second, public policy is also about the ability 
of certain parties to shift uncompensated costs 
and risks to other parties. Indeed, public policy 
can be thought of as incidence policy, where the 
essence of the policy is to redistribute power and 
property rights (Bromley 1990, Schmid 2000, Vatn 
and Bromley 1994, and Wildavsky 1987). The 
values, that is, the implicit prices, embedded in 
policy are usually found through some negotiated 
process of bargaining after decision makers con-
front alternative choices (Schmid 2000, Samuels 
1989). 
 Thus,  the  intentions of public policy are desired 
future outcomes (Bromley forthcoming). For ex-
ample, two intentions of soil conservation policy 
are to reduce soil erosion and water pollution. 
The policy vehicles to obtain these desired out-
comes are technical assistance and the compensa-
tion to farmers with public payments for the vol-
untary adoption of soil conservation and pollution 
prevention practices. The policy prescribes what 
should be accomplished (i.e., adopt practices) to 
presumably obtain the desired outcomes (Brom-
ley forthcoming). In addition, farmers are assumed 
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to be worthy beneficiaries and are assumed to 
have the property rights for soil erosion and pol-
lution. Thus, the policy assumption is that farmers 
should be compensated for any changes society 
asks of them to reduce soil erosion and pollution. 
  If policy (intentions, rules, and enforcement) is 
to be informed by economic science-based policy 
analysis, then there must be policy-relevant 
economic science (Jasanoff 1990). One can think 
of policy analysis as a substitute for learning by 
explicit decision making; it allows decision makers 
to avoid trial and error experiments (Wildavsky 
1987). Good policy analysis will evaluate, order, 
and structure incomplete knowledge so as to 
allow decisions to be made with an understanding 
of the current state of knowledge, its limitations, 
and its implications (Morgan 1978). Done well, 
economic policy analysis can inform decision 
makers about alternative institutional arrange-
ments; it can expand the range of choices in the 
debate; it can provide an estimate of the opportu-
nity cost of choices and outcomes; it can reframe 
the policy problem definition; it can identify po-
tential solutions; it can identify values or incen-
tives associated with particular choices; it can 
provide information that will lead to changes in 
regulatory processes and procedures; it can combat 
misinformation and raise the value of informa-
tion; and it can provide legitimacy for some argu-
ments (Shabman 1989).  
 
 
The Role of Applied Economists 
 
Applied economists bring a disciplinary lens to 
our analysis—as to what are the important ques-
tions to be asked, whose values are to count, and 
what alternatives are worthy of examination (Sa-
batier and Zafonte 1999). That is, agricultural 
economists rely on our discipline—which is what 
makes our policy analysis more valuable than that 
of the person-on-the-street. But truly nonpartisan, 
dispassionate policy analysis requires that the 
analyst make transparent the disciplinary as-
sumptions and premises that underlie the analysis 
(e.g., that preferences are fixed and stable and/or 
that interpersonal comparisons are disallowed).
1  
  Analysts also need to understand the limits of 
their ability to act as advisers to the policy proc-
ess. There is no scientific imperative to a policy 
alternative (Lackey 2004). That is, applied econo-
mists can inform the debate with the economic 
way of thinking, but economists are not the ap-
pointed gatekeepers of the outcome of the debate. 
  Not every applied economist will be interested 
in supplying economic policy analysis, of course. 
Shabman (2000) divides researchers into four 
policy “types”: closet scientists, arm’s-length sci-
entists, client advocates, and science advocates. 
Both closet scientists and arm’s-length scientists 
are found throughout universities. Closet scientists 
do not become involved with policy, and they 
expect decision makers to find out what they need 
from the academic community without assistance. 
Arm’s-length scientists are willing to help and to 
explain, but they do not really want to be in-
volved in the policy process to ensure the best use 
of their research. In contrast, client advocates are 
not appropriate within the university in that they 
are advocates for a client’s values and position. 
They are not objective in that they disregard 
science and research that does not support their 
client’s values, position, or arguments. They tend 
to be found in companies and client-controlled, 
partisan think tanks. Science advocates actively 
participate in the policy process and policy 
debates and use their research to introduce new 
alternatives into the policy debate. Most of these 
science advocates are found in universities, in 
agencies such as the Economic Research Service, 
or in nonpartisan think tanks such as Resources 
for the Future (Shabman 2000). 
  Professionals can change throughout their ca-
reer to become a different type of policy re-
searcher. For many researchers, the move to sci-
ence advocate occurs later in their career. Also, a 
researcher may be a closet or arm’s-length econo-
mist on some policy issues, but an active science 
advocate on others (Shabman 2000). 
  I will be referring for the rest of this paper to 
this latter type of economist—the economic sci-
ence advocate—as well as to the type of policy-
relevant analysis that they supply. But supply 
does not create its own demand. The remainder of 
the paper explores the demand for economic pol-
icy analysis. 
  __________________________________________ 
4 See Rhoads (1985) for a discussion of the normative assumptions 
underlying welfare economics and benefit cost analysis. See Shabman
and Stephenson (1996) for a discussion of how different types of envi-
________________________________________________________
ronmental and resource economists approach policy issues and what 
their underlying premises of analysis are. 
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The Demand for Economic Policy Analysis 
 
The demand for economic policy analysis may 
come from many sources and may even be engi-
neered by an analyst. One of the problems with 
economics information is that so few policymak-
ers believe they need it (Bonnen 2000, Srivastava 
2003). Policymakers tend to rely on their own 
experiences and knowledge in resolving issues of 
economic analysis, and it may require some en-
trepreneurial work on the part of the economic 
science advocate to convince policymakers that 
economic analysis can provide them with some-
thing that is valuable. 
  Demand for economic policy analysis will be a 
function of several components, including the 
“tastes and preferences” of the policymaker, the 
value of the analysis to the policymaker, the price 
of the analysis as measured by its costs to the 
policymaker (i.e., out-of-pocket costs, opportunity 
costs, and political costs), the political and finan-
cial budget constraint of the policymaker, and the 
availability, value, and price of substitutes, as 
well as the stage of the political process (e.g., 
timing). 
 
  The Policymaker. There are different types of 
policymakers. Differences stem from different 
foci of interest (e.g., technical assistance or fi-
nancing), different levels of government (e.g., fed-
eral or state), different functions within an institu-
tion (e.g., administrative or program staff), and 
different institutional settings (e.g., politicians, 
bureaucrats, resource managers, or regulators). 
Each type of policymaker may desire different 
types of economic analysis tailored for his or her 
particular decision needs. 
 
  The Value of the Analysis. Public policy analy-
sis needs to have value within the political proc-
ess to be demanded. The immediate policy value 
of a significant amount of published academic 
policy analysis is questionable (Lee 2002, Oh 
1996). Indeed, for many policymakers, the word 
“academic” is synonymous with, at best, “theo-
retical and not practical,” or, at worst, “irrele-
vant.” Publication of policy analyses are not suf-
ficient for policy relevancy. The applied econo-
mist who desires to be a science advocate must go 
beyond mere publication. 
  There are challenges to providing valuable 
analyses. As mentioned previously, public policy 
is about values as well as the incidence of costs 
and benefits. Yet, many times the debate is cloaked 
so that these values and incidence concerns are 
not obvious. Consider soil conservation policy de-
bates, which, on the surface, appear to be about 
the most cost-effective way to achieve soil ero-
sion reductions. There has been considerable pub-
lished research that demonstrates that, as transac-
tion costs are reduced, it is cost-effective to target 
conservation program vehicles—both spatially and 
temporally—to achieve soil or water quality objec-
tives (e.g., Feather, Hellerstein, and Hansen 1999, 
Ribaudo 1986, Ribaudo 1989, and Yang et al. 
2005). Thus, targeting appears to be an obvious 
soil conservation policy alternative. However, the 
policymakers may be far more concerned about 
fairness and equity—making sure all who are 
deemed deserving obtain benefits—or they may 
be concerned about replacing existing commodity 
programs with conservation ones, while ensuring 
the same level of payments to individual produc-
ers. If the latter is the case, the policy debate will 
probably be deaf to a targeting-as-efficiency ar-
gument (Bromley 1990). 
  Furthermore, proposed alternatives will tend to 
be ignored unless analysts provide alternatives 
that are accessible to (non-expert) policymakers, 
that are appropriate to their institutional culture, 
and that include variables under the control of the 
policymakers in the time available (Wildavsky 
1987). Wildavsky (1987) refers to this relevant 
type of analysis as “identifying problems that can 
be solved.” 
  An example of a failure to provide relevant 
economic analyses, at least in the short run, comes 
from water pollution economics research. The 
trading of environmental credits requires a willing 
buyer and seller (Horan, Shortle, and Abler 2004). 
Successful trading of nonpoint pollutants requires 
a farmer to reduce his or her farm’s pollution to 
earn an environmental credit available to trade. 
However, if a state law has a “zero discharge” 
law for water pollutants, then there will be nothing 
for farmers to legally trade in any proposed pollu-
tion credits trading scheme. Unless the policy-
makers believe that changing the law is a near-
term probability, they will not find research out-
lining alternative water pollution trading programs 
pertinent to their short-run implementation needs. 
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  Another example comes from a personal ex-
perience. In a conversation with a state environ-
mental regulator, I suggested the use of water 
quality performance standards as an alternative to 
on-farm soil conservation design standards. I ar-
gued on the basis of research-supported conclu-
sions that lower costs and higher probability of 
water quality improvements would be an outcome 
of such standards. The response from the agency 
person was “Do not give me any Cadillac plan, 
Sandra. I just need a check sheet so I will know if 
the farmer has completed the requirement.” I had 
proposed something that vastly exceeded the 
ability of this resource-limited (and often liti-
gated) agency to implement—even with my in-
clusion of a few low-cost proxies for measuring 
performance. I had flunked the “real world prac-
tical implementation test” with that particular 
economic argument. 
  There are circumstances where policymakers 
do not desire nonpartisan, objective information, 
and may even be threatened by such information 
if it does not validate their political positions 
(Rich and Oh 2000). Unless persuaded otherwise, 
the value of such policy analysis—no matter how 
well done—to these decision makers may be zero, 
or even negative. 
  Finally, most problems require a multidiscipli-
nary research approach for a well-informed, sci-
ence-based response (Parsons 1995). If the eco-
nomic analysis draws only from the economics dis-
cipline without significant and realistic inputs from 
other sciences, the policymaker may find the analy-
sis incomplete or naive for his or her purposes. 
 
  Costs. Costs are important in the calculations of 
the net worth of economic policy analysis. There 
are four important types of costs that influence 
the demand for economic policy analysis and 
which comprise the implicit price of the analysis 
to the policymaker. These costs are the out-of-
pocket costs of the analysis, the opportunity and 
the transaction costs associated with policy alter-
natives, and the political costs. 
  The theory of bounded rationality informs ap-
plied economists that the search for information is 
limited (March and Simon 1958). One obvious 
source of limitation is the out-of-pocket costs of 
the analysis itself. In addition, there may be seri-
ous time constraints. Economic policy analysis 
that comes with too high a price tag and which 
takes too long will not be in demand. The total 
price tag may be influenced by the opportunity 
costs associated with either the analysis itself or 
alternatives that emerge from the analysis. These 
types of costs will be sensitive to the size of asso-
ciated transaction costs, including the probabili-
ties of court litigation of policy decisions and 
resulting outcomes. 
  Policies also have specific political price tags 
(May 1986). “Any policy action entails political 
costs, with some proposals being more costly than 
others. Like financial costs, the political costs of a 
policy proposal revolve around prices and op-
portunity costs. Securing approval or implement-
ing a policy proposal involves a ‘price’ in the 
form of policy or other concessions that diminish 
the policy advocate’s store of political capital. 
Even if enacted (and certainly if not enacted), 
there are opportunity costs of not giving attention 
to other, perhaps more profitable issues. Balanced 
against these prices and opportunity costs are the 
political consequences of being associated with 
enactment of, or failure to enact, a particular pol-
icy proposal” (May 1986, p. 113). 
  The Political and Financial Budget Constraints. 
Political feasibility screens can be thought of as 
political budgets, that is, what the policymaker 
can afford to spend. If the alternatives that emerge 
from the analysis cannot fit through the political 
feasibility “screen” as perceived by the policy-
maker, demand for the analysis will be quite 
limited. One component of such screens might be 
political party platforms that, say, pledge “no new 
taxes.” In this case, an economic analysis of the 
ability of a tax on inputs to reduce pollutants 
would be seen as impractical and infeasible. 
  The Availability and Quality of Substitutes. As 
public provision of information and policy analy-
sis has declined, substitutes have arisen. Some are 
close to perfect substitutes, some are nonpartisan 
but narrowly focused, and others are imperfect 
substitutes or even blatantly biased (Bonnen 2000). 
One of the challenges of our modern information-
rich society is to discern the quality of the avail-
able information. Nevertheless, for a variety of 
reasons, policymakers may demand economic pol-
icy analysis from non-academic sources. 
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  The Stage of the Political Process. The political 
process has its own temporal (and spatial) logic, 
which influences what questions get asked, what 
alternatives are considered, and what choices are 
made. A policy economic science advocate will 
be more effective if he or she understands where 
an issue is in the political process, what type of 
information is desired, who desires it, and for 
what reasons it is desired. 
  There is also a limited political attention span—
much has been written about the cycles associated 
with attention to particular topics or the cycle of 
political interest for a particular topic (Bosso 1987, 
Downs 1972). Political attention to policy analy-
sis is usually more receptive before an issue has 
become controversial or before bargaining and 
compromise mechanisms have resulted in an agree-
ment on the appropriate policy choices. 
 
  Other Demand Shifters.  There are additional 
shifters of the demand for analysis. Exogenous 
events, the skill of the analyst, or the regulatory 
requirement for more analysis (e.g., a required 
positive benefit-cost ratio) are some examples of 
possible demand shifters. Also, occasionally, an 
event will trigger a search for information or al-
ternative courses of action. For example, the fre-
quent reconsideration of the Farm Bill is usually 
accompanied by a search for policy alternatives 
for its redesign. Or, as another example, large 
pollution events may cause a search for alterna-
tive regulatory policies for large animal confine-
ment facilities. Sometimes, institutions such as 
the federal Office of Management and Budget 
may be a catalyst for more program information 
and attendant economic analyses. 
 
Why Is Economic Science-Advocacy So 
Difficult? 
As my career in agri-environmental policy analy-
sis has progressed, it has become increasingly 
difficult to be an effective economic science ad-
vocate in the policy process. I think there are many 
reasons for this increased difficulty. One obvious 
reason is the declining public respect for science 
and experts as well as institutions. The one-time 
public optimism about the wisdom of progress 
stemming from scientific discoveries has dimin-
ished as the trade-offs associated with technolo-
gies and various progressive choices have be-
come more visible (Batie 1992, Bocking 2004, 
and Bonnen 2000). 
  Furthermore, this declining public respect has 
been coupled with heightened uncertainty associ-
ated with globalization, the information revolu-
tion, the increasing complexity of issues, the 
changing global politics, and the rapid pace of 
change (Bocking 2004, Gilbert 2005, Graffy 
2005, and Wildavsky 1987). For just one exam-
ple, consider the complexity of environmental is-
sues. At one time the nature of environmental 
risks was focused on acute risks of primarily local 
impact and short time frames with relatively ob-
vious benefit/cost ratios and considerable public 
support. Now many of the risks are chronic in 
nature, with global impacts and long time frames 
for potential impacts. The risk/benefit ratios are 
highly uncertain and controversial; public support 
is uncertain as well (Gilbert 2005). 
  At such times of heightened uncertainty, the 
public tends to turn to religious and other strongly 
held belief ideologies, and as a result has less use 
and respect for dispassionate research. Indeed, 
some of the public may become quite anti-intel-
lectual (Bocking 2004, Bonnen 2000, and Wil-
davsky 1987). When this occurs, the public tends 
to disinvest in institutions that provide informa-
tion that might run counter to these ideologies 
(Bonnen 2000). 
  At the same time, there has been a growing 
polarization of politics by political leadership as 
well as the fragmenting of authority (Bonnen, 
Browne, and Schweikhardt 1996). In such a politi-
cal environment, policy analyses are used mainly 
as political weapons (Wildavsky 1987). Also, 
since the early 1970s, most policy debates have 
attracted organized interests (e.g., consumers, en-
vironmentalists, and minorities) with different 
values and differing perceptions of problems, their 
severity, their causes, and their impacts (Sabatier 
and Zafonte 1999). Policy debate has become 
very complicated. 
  The result of all of these trends is a society that 
is “increasingly critical of science, the academy, 
and all experts.... The earlier commitment to more 
reasoned, pragmatic approaches to problems and 
to the production and use of objective, nonparti-
san information in politics and public policy has 
been slowly undermined” (Bonnen 2000, p. 508). 
When strongly held values are in conflict in 
sharply partisan debates, there is less room for 
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bargaining, compromise, or the use of nonpartisan 
information, including economic policy analysis. 
  In addition, there are plenty of imperfect substi-
tutes for nonpartisan policy analysis. The rise of 
partisan think tanks, funded generously by stealth 
lobbyists, and populated by client advocates who 
aim to arm one side of partisan debates with care-
fully tailored information weapons, has led to a 
situation where dogma trumps data (Rampton and 
Stauber 2000). The public, even if they are inter-
ested, have trouble sifting through these compet-
ing sources of information with quality screens. 
This inability to discern the objectivity of re-
search findings further leads to suspicion of all 
self-proclaimed experts (Bocking 2004, Bonnen 
2000, and Jasanoff 1990). 
  In such a climate, nonpartisan, objective, dispas-
sionate economic policy analysis is not only in 
less demand, it is harder to supply. Some decision 
makers want to know which side of the debate the 
analyst is supporting. They may disbelieve that an 
analyst is nonpartisan. This situation is not such a 
problem if the policy analysis tends to support a 
policymaker’s pre-determined political position, 
but it is problematic if the conclusions of the 
analysis (i.e., the predicted outcomes of a policy 
alternative) undermine a favored political position. 
 
The Challenges to the Policy Economist 
In this policy process environment, there are 
many challenges to the economic science advo-
cate. I will mention two: (i) the challenges of be-
ing effective in the process and (ii) the challenges 
of being rewarded for being effective in the 
process. 
 
  Effective Science-Advocacy. Policy relevancy 
requires that the science advocate understand the 
policy in question, the issues of concern, and the 
institutions and stakeholders involved in the deci-
sion(s). This requirement suggests a considerable 
amount of effort by the analyst in understanding 
the history of the issues surrounding the policy, 
the motivations of the actors involved, and the 
policy process itself. Also, to be an effective ana-
lyst requires a commitment to learning about the 
art and craft of policy analysis. 
  A quickly learned lesson is that, to the extent 
that analysts are arm’s-length scientists or closet 
scientists and publish analyses in journals di-
vorced from the policy process, or preach only 
about efficiency, or refuse to provide an analysis 
that is germane to the current policy debate, they 
will be ignored by policymakers. The less useful 
the analysis as a decision-support tool, the less 
trust there will be in economic analysts’ abilities, 
and the more decision makers will turn to alter-
native providers of information—frequently these 
providers are internal to their own organization 
(Wildavsky 1987). 
  This observation decidedly does not mean that 
the analyst should “cook the books” so that the 
decision maker obtains the desired results for a 
predetermined and favored outcome (Shabman 
2005). Quite the opposite—conclusions from valid 
analysis should not be abandoned because of a 
political litmus test. To stay within the policy de-
bate, and still speak “truth to power” (Wildavsky 
1987), however, an analyst can use the condi-
tional normative approach. This approach in-
volves placing policy statements within “if, then” 
clauses. An example of such an approach would 
be framed thus: “If the desired outcome is cost-
effectiveness (e.g., a budget concern), then one 
should target…. But, if the desired outcome is to 
spread benefits widely so that more stakeholders 
benefit from the program (e.g., a fairness concern), 
then one should not target…. The trade-offs (i.e., 
opportunity costs) between targeting and not tar-
geting are as follows….” If the political process is 
focused on balancing budget and fairness con-
cerns, such information can be quite useful and 
lead to more informed decision making. 
  Another successful technique is to provide pol-
icy analysis and the framing of policy problems 
and alternatives before the particular policy issue 
has obtained much public attention. There is an 
art and political instinct to this ability to see is-
sues as policy problems before they emerge. It is 
a means of conducting analysis with less contro-
versy and being better prepared for the public 
debate once the issue emerges. Such preparation 
also usually ensures some invitation into the de-
bate once it becomes more public. 
 
  Rewards and Incentives. What conclusions can 
be drawn about rewards for policy-relevant eco-
nomic analyses? It may seem inappropriate for 
me—a well-rewarded person—to talk about the 
difficulties of being rewarded for policy work. 
Yet, despite my personal successes, I think it can 
be difficult for an academic to be rewarded for 
economic science-advocacy. 
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  Publishing journal articles is not mutually ex-
clusive from effective policy analysis, but pub-
lishing is not central to such analysis either. And, 
for many researchers, publishing is critical to their 
career evaluation, but the reverse is not usually 
true. That is, being effective in the political proc-
ess is not usually a critical component of a 
successful research career. Indeed, in the worst 
case, economic science-advocacy may invite criti-
cism from one’s peers and administrators. Also, 
analysts within public agencies are frequently 
discouraged from actively engaging the policy 
process. That is, agency researchers can conduct 
nonpartisan policy-relevant analysis, but directing 
the attention of a policymaker to such analyses is 
left to others. Thus, for some individuals, pursu-
ing the economic science-advocacy career route 
may mean limited institutional rewards and incen-
tives. 
  Also, because politics can be contentious and 
partisan, sometimes an economic science advo-
cate needs courage to proceed. On occasion, some 
interest group or individual may take offense at 
the analysis and attempt to discredit the economic 
science advocate. Not every researcher is willing 
to expose themselves to the risk of either being 
attacked or being forced to trust their administra-
tors to protect him or her. 
  Still, despite the difficulties, there is consider-
able satisfaction in doing economic science-advo-
cacy well. Furthermore, there is considerable im-
portance in our profession of supplying high-
quality nonpartisan analysis. As an applied sci-
ence that focuses on decision making, agricultural 
economics has much to offer. But, if a decade 
from now, the recipient of NAREA’s “Out-
standing Public Service Through Economics” 
award is to praise the great progress the profes-
sion has made in informing policy decisions, then 
more applied economists need to understand the 
demand for policy analysis, to invest in increasing 
the quantity demanded and shifting the demand 
curve for such analysis, and to improve insti-
tutional incentives for the supply of excellent 
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